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Studia Logica

, Volume 49, Issue 4, pp 523–539 | Cite as

A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief

  • Heinrich Wansing
Article

Abstract

In this paper non-normal worlds semantics is presented as a basic, general, and unifying approach to epistemic logic. The semantical framework of non-normal worlds is compared to the model theories of several logics for knowledge and belief that were recently developed in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is shown that every model for implicit and explicit belief (Levesque), for awareness, general awareness, and local reasoning (Fagin and Halpern), and for awareness and principles (van der Hoek and Meyer) induces a non-normal worlds model validating precisely the same formulas (of the language in question).

Keywords

Artificial Intelligence Mathematical Logic Model Theory Unify Approach Computational Linguistic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Polish Academy of Sciences 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Heinrich Wansing
    • 1
  1. 1.Gruppe für LogikWissenstheorie und Information FU BerlinBerlin 33Germany

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