Philosophical Studies

, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp 335–348 | Cite as

Sellars' argument for the inevitability of the secondary qualities

  • C. A. Hooker


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    Cornman, J. W., ‘Sellars, Scientific Realism and Sensa’, Review of Metaphysics 23 (1970), 417–451.Google Scholar
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    Hooker, C. A., ‘A Realist Doctrine of Perception and a Nihilist Doctrine of the Secondary Qualities’, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1976).Google Scholar
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    Hooker, C. A., ‘Systematic Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy of Science: Empiricism, Popperian and Realism’, Synthese 32 (1975), 177–231.Google Scholar
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    Sellars, W., ‘The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem’, in R.S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, 1962–1964, Humanities Press, New York, 1965.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • C. A. Hooker
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Western OntarioCanada

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