Philosophical Studies

, Volume 68, Issue 1, pp 35–56 | Cite as

Against Modalism

  • Joseph Melia
Article

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph Melia
    • 1
  1. 1.Jesus CollegeCambridgeEngland

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