Phenomenology: Vigorous or moribund?

James M.Edie, “Phenomenology in America, 1984,” Research in Phenomenology XIV (1984), 322–246. Cf. also Gary Madison, “Contemporary Status of Continental Philosophy in Canada: A Narrative,” presented to the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 23rd Annual Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, 18–20 October 1984; Hugh Silverman, “The Continental Face of Philosophy in America,” Philosophy Today XXVII (1983), 275–280; Don Ihde, “Phenomenology in America,” in his Consequences of Phenomenology (Albany: State University of New York, 1986), 1–26.Google Scholar

EdmundHusserl, Logical Investigations (hereafter cited as L.I.), trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 256 (Hua XIX/1, 16–17).Google Scholar

There is of course a tradition of such efforts, which will doubtless be carried on on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Husserl's death to be commemorated in sessions at the 1988 World Congress of Philosophy in Bristol. Cf., e.g., Mauric Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), i, and Pierre Thévenaz, What is Phenomenology?, ed. James M. Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1962).Google Scholar

Cf. HubertDreyfus, ed., Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982).Google Scholar

Cf. L.Koŀakowski, Husserl and the search for Certitude (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).Google Scholar

Cf. RichardSchmitt, “Phenomenology,” in P.A.Edwards, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967) Vol. VI, 135–151.Google Scholar

Cf. MoritzSchlick, “Is There A Factual A Priori?” in H.Feigl and W.Sellars, Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1949), 277–285.Google Scholar

Cf. RobertSokolowski, Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).Google Scholar

Cf. Henry Pietersma, “Husserl's Views on the Evident and the True,” in Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick, eds., Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals (University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 38–53.Google Scholar

Cf. Richard Schmitt, op.cit.Google Scholar

Husserl occasionally inveighs against his superficial critics, among whom he numbered MoritzSchlick. Cf., e.g., Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book (here-after cited as Ideas), trans. F. Kersten (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; 1983), 40–41 (Hua III/1, 48f.).Google Scholar

It is most fully described in Ideas I, para. 27–30 (Hua III/1, 56–61).Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 42 (Hua XVIII, 7).Google Scholar

Edmund Husserl, “Author's Preface to the English Edition of Ideas,” in F. Elliston and P. McCormick, Husserl: Shorter Works (University of Notre Dame/Harvester Press, 1981), 43–53, 48.Google Scholar

Ideas I, 63 (Hua III/1, 67). The italics here and in subsequent quotations are Husserl's.Google Scholar

Ibid., 64 (Hua III/1, 67).Google Scholar

Ibid., 65 (Hua III/1, 68).Google Scholar

Cf. RobertSokolowski, Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 138.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 207 (Hua XVIII, 208–209).Google Scholar

Ibid., 193 (Hua XVIII, 191).Google Scholar

Ibid., 217 (Hua XVIII, 220).Google Scholar

E.g., that it is a “pseudo-problem bred by unclarity” (L.I., 218 [Hua XVIII, 221]); that the distinction between the ideal (truth) and the real is not a genuine distinction (cf. L.I., 225 [Hua XVIII, 230]).Google Scholar

Cf. A.deWaelhens, Phénoménologie et vérité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953), 55–57.Google Scholar

Cf. AlfredSchutz, “Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Phenomenology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XX (1959–60), 147–165.Google Scholar

This was first urged by D.M. Levin in “Induction and Husserl's Theory of Eidetic Variation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XXIX (1968), 1–15. Cf. also his Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

Cf. JamesPalermo, “Apodictic Truth: Husserl's Eidetic Reduction versus Induction,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic XIX (1978), 69–80.Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., T.W.Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Meta-critique. Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies, trans. Willis Domingo (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1983).Google Scholar

L.I., 254 (Hua XIX/1, 14).Google Scholar

Ibid., 255 (Hua XIX/1, 14).Google Scholar

Cf. EugenFink, “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism,” in R.O.Elveton, ed., The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 73–147.Google Scholar

Cf. NathanRotenstreich, “Variations of Transcendentalism,” in Kah KyungCho, ed., Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 171–181.Google Scholar

L.I., 251 (Hua XIX/1, 9).Google Scholar

Cf. ibid., 207 (Hua XVIII, 208–209).Google Scholar

J.N.Mohanty favours this sense. Cf. his The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 244.Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., Schlick, op.cit.Google Scholar

Cf. GilbertRyle, “Review of Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology,” Philosophy XXI (1946), 263–69.Google Scholar

Cf. introduction to E.Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. W.P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1964), xxi.Google Scholar

Cf. David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre, “Intentionality via Intension,” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 541f.Google Scholar

This is not to deny altogether that Husserl is not used at times to serve “transcendental” interests. For example, our contemporaries are much exercized with intentionality and one might take a concern with intentionality to be eo ipso a transcendental interest. Secondly, although we Anglophones seem genetically determined to dismiss the second sense of transcendental, the sense having to do with the notion of “pure” consciousness, the use to which Husserl is being put as a progenitor of cognitive science suggests that something of that very traditional and controversial sense of “transcendental” is still with us. Perhaps Fodor's model of mind, given his clear sense of its limitations, does in the end come down to being an “as if” transcendentalism of a decidedly Husserlian stamp. Cf. Dreyfus, op.cit., 15–17 and, in that same collection, Jerry Fodor, “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology,” 277–303.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 232 (Hua XVIII, 238–239).Google Scholar

Cf. Mohanty, op.cit., particularly the introduction and the thirteenth essay.Google Scholar

Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 18 (Hua II, 23).Google Scholar

Cf. e.g., WolfeMays, “Genetic Analysis and Experience: Husserl and Piaget,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology VIII (1977), 51–55. For the counter-position cf. Christopher McCann, “Genetic Production and Transcendental Reduction,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology II (1971), 28–34.Google Scholar

Cf. EdmundHusserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), 76–77 (Hua I, 110–111).Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., Ideas I, 22 (Hua III/1, 27–28).Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., J.D.Caputo, “Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a ‘Hermeneutic’ Phenomenology,” Husserl Studies 1 (1984), 157–178; and H.P. Reeder, “A Phenomenological Account of the Linguistic Mediation of the Public and the Private,” ibid., 263–280.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 246 (Hua XVIII, 257).Google Scholar

It is clear though that he recognized and was concerned about this possibility. Cf. L.I., 255 (Hua XIX/1, 15).Google Scholar

L.I., 46 (Hua XVIII, 11).Google Scholar

Cf. ibid., 262 (Hua XIX/1, 22–23).Google Scholar

Op.cit.Google Scholar

Cf. my “Schlick's Critique of Phenomenological Propositions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLV (1984) 195–225.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I. 466–467 (Hua XIX/1, 270–272).Google Scholar

Cf. Koŀakowski, op.cit., 69 and 81.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 528 (Hua XIX/1, 350).Google Scholar

Cf. ibid., 263 (Hua XIX/1, 24–25).Google Scholar

Ibid., 322 (Hua XIX/1, 97).Google Scholar

Ideas I, 179 (Hua III/1, 167).Google Scholar

Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, 111 (Hua I, 141).Google Scholar

EdmundHusserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1969) 215 (Hua XVII, 223). (Hereafter cited as FTL.)Google Scholar

EdmundHusserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) 245 (Hua VI, 248).Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., L.I., 463 (Hua XIX/1, 267) where Husserl gives deductive proofs of propositions “familiar to us in another guise.” We have to allow for the possibility that both — a) a proposition is what it is (i.e., phenomenological) in part because of the method which produced it and, b) identical propositions might be produced by different methods — are true.Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., the sentence beginning with “Vague expressions have no single meaning content ...” and the following sentence from L.I., 320 (Hua XIX/1, 93).Google Scholar

FTL, 159–160 (Hua XVII, 158).Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 263 (Hua XIX/1, 25).Google Scholar

Ibid., 481 (Hua XIX/1, 290–291).Google Scholar

Ibid., 263 (Hua XIX/1, 25).Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 472–476 (Hua XIX/1, 279–283).Google Scholar

161 (Hua XVII, 169).Google Scholar

Cf. Pietersma, op.cit.Google Scholar

Cf. Schmitt, op.cit.Google Scholar

Ideas I, 188 (Hua III/1, 176). Cf. also L.I., 262 (Hua XIX/1, 23).Google Scholar

Cf. MoritzSchlick, “Is There Intuitive Knowledge?,” Philosophical Papers, I, ed. H.L.Mulder and B.F.B.Van deVelde-Schlick, trans. Peter Heath (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), 141–152.Google Scholar

L.I., 388 (Hua XIX/1, 172–173).Google Scholar

Cf. Ideas I, Author's Footnote 18, 188 (Hua III/1, 176, Footnote 1).Google Scholar

Cf. David Michael Levin, Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology.Google Scholar

Cf. J.N. Mohanty, “Towards a Phenomenology of Self-Evidence,” in op.cit., 83–100.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 120 (Hua XVIII, 99).Google Scholar

L.I., 139 (Hua XVIII, 123).Google Scholar

(This occurs also in the Prolegomena, but I have been unable to relocate the passage.)Google Scholar

Ibid., 329, 330 (Hua XIX/1, 105).Google Scholar

Ibid., 233 (Hua XVIII, 210).Google Scholar

Cf. ibid., 192 (Hua XVIII, 190).Google Scholar

Cf. ibid., 340 (Hua XIX/1, 114–115).Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., ibid., 338 (Hua XIX/1, 112).Google Scholar

In this he resembles some of the proponents of the “justified true belief” notion.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 523 (Hua XIX/1, 344). Cf. my “Schlick's Critique of Phenomenological Propositions.”Google Scholar

Cf. op.cit., 242–243.Google Scholar

FTL, 156 (Hua 140).Google Scholar

Op.cit.Google Scholar

Cf. Eugen Fink, op.cit. (Husserl fully endorsed Fink's article).Google Scholar

Cf. his “The Three Ways to Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl,” in F. Elliston and P. McCormick, Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, 126–149.Google Scholar

Cf. KarlSchuhmann, Die Fundamentalbetrachtung der Phänomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1971), xxviii-xxxvii.Google Scholar

Cf. my “Husserl and the Need for Other Persons,” in Man and Value: Essays in Honour of William H. Werkmeister, ed. E.F. Kaelin et al. (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1951), 84–96.Google Scholar

Cf. Mohanty, op.cit., xiii-xxxii. He opposes D.Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 17 (1973–74), 5–20.Google Scholar

Cf. Mohanty, op.cit., 161ff., and J.C.EvansJr., The Metaphysics of Transcendental Subjectivity: Descartes, Kant and W. Sellars (Amsterdam: Verlag B.R. Gruener, 1984).Google Scholar

L.I., 765 (Hua XIX/2, 651–652).Google Scholar

Ibid., 766 (Hua XIX/2, 652).Google Scholar

Cf. op.cit.Google Scholar

Cf. Schlick, “Is There a Factual A Priori?”.Google Scholar

Cf. Ideas I, 142 (Hua III/1, 133).Google Scholar

“Preface to the English Edition of Ideas,” 49.Google Scholar

This was Russell's opinion. Cf. HerbertSpiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1965), 93 n. 1.Google Scholar

Some of his critics' vices are catalogued in “Preface to the English Edition of Ideas.” The insinuation of intellectual dishonesty infuses the polemic with Schlick.Google Scholar

Cf. L.I., 166–168 (Hua XVIII, 156).Google Scholar

Cf. Husserl, “Phenomenology” (Encyclopedia Britannica article) in Husserl: Shorter Works, 21–35, 35.Google Scholar

Cf., e.g., MauritaHarney, Intentionality, Sense and the Mind (The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984) and J.N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982). (It is not meant, by citing these books as cases of “typical” Husserl scholarship, to in any way suggest that they are not of considerable interest and merit.)Google Scholar

Cf. Dreyfus, op.cit.Google Scholar