Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp 271–291 | Cite as

Choosing from a tournament

  • H. Moulin


A tournament is any complete asymmetric relation over a finite set A of outcomes describing pairwise comparisons. A choice correspondence assigns to every tournament on A a subset of winners. Miller's uncovered set is an example for which we propose an axiomatic characterization. The set of Copeland winners (outcomes with maximal scores) is another example; it is a subset of the uncovered set: we note that it can be a dominated subset. A third example is derived from the sophisticated agenda algorithm; we argue that it is a better choice correspondence than the Copeland set.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. Moulin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityBlacksburgUSA

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