On the core of voting games
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyse a special class of cooperative games called voting games in the cases where the set of alternatives is finite or a convex and compact subset of an Euclidean space. In a first part we provide a complete classification of these games according to the non-emptiness of the core. Then in a second part we prove that the set of continuous preference profiles having a core is small from a topological point of view. The contribution of the paper is mainly a simplification of the existing proofs and the introduction of a suitable topology to formulate the second question.
Keywords
Economic Theory Euclidean Space Compact Subset Special Class Cooperative Game
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