“Mises redux” — Redux: Fifteen arguments against finite frequentism
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According to finite frequentism, the probability of an attribute A in a finite reference class B is the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B. I present fifteen arguments against this position.
KeywordsRelative Frequency Reference Class Actual Occurrence Finite Frequentism
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