Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 359–363 | Cite as

Possible-world semantics for counterfactual logics: A rejoinder

  • David Lewis
Critical Notes

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References

  1. [1]
    B. D. Ellis, F. C. Jackson and R. J. Pargetter, ‘An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics’, this issue, pp. 359–363.Google Scholar
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    B. D. Ellis, ‘Epistemology, Validity and Truth’, presented at the 1976 annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne.Google Scholar
  3. [3]
    K.Fine, critical notice of Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Mind 84 (1975) 451–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. [4]
    T. McKay and P. van Inwagen, ‘Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents’, Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    D.Lewis, ‘General Semantics’, Synthese 22 (1970) 18–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. [6]
    B.Loewer, ‘Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents’, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) 531–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. [7]
    D.Nute, ‘Counterfactuals and the Similarity of Worlds’, Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975) 773–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Lewis
    • 1
  1. 1.Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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