Public Choice

, Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 3–25 | Cite as

An agenda for the study of institutions

  • Elinor Ostrom
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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elinor Ostrom
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceIndiana UniversityBloomington
  2. 2.Workshop in Political Theory & Policy AnalysisIndiana UniversityBloomington

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