The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Keeping confidential who sends which messages, in a world where any physical transmission can be traced to its origin, seems impossible. The solution presented here is unconditionally or cryptographically secure, depending on whether it is based on one-time-use keys or on public keys, respectively. It can be adapted to address efficiently a wide variety of practical considerations.
Key wordsUntraceability Unconditional Security Pseudonymity
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