Plea bargaining and the decision to go to trial: The application of a rational choice model
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Abstract
What factors determine the plea bargain which prosecutors will offer defendants? What factors determine whether or not a defendant will demand a trial? The former question is relevant to our assessment of the fairness of plea bargaining; the latter question is relevant to prosecution management. Landes provides an economic model of the criminal courts which suggests answers to these questions. While several researchers have provided empirical analysis at least consistent with the Landes model, there has been no test of the model's power for predicting individual case decisions. After providing a derivation of a rational choice model similar to that of Landes but incorporating organizational considerations, the empirical validity of the model is tested using individual case data. Major predictions, including the structural form of the plea bargain offer equation, are validated. Other findings, which do not validate the model's predictions, are discussed in terms of the organizational incentive structure facing assistant prosecutors. A discussion of the application of the model to aid in prosecution management is presented, including an indication of the importance of looking at the distribution of prediction errors as well as the overall rate of prediction error. Finally, comments are made concerning the use of econometrics in an organizational context.
Keywords
Prediction Error Organizational Context Incentive Structure Empirical Validity Criminal CourtPreview
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