Journal of Cryptology

, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 99–111 | Cite as

How to time-stamp a digital document

  • Stuart Haber
  • W. Scott Stornetta
Article

Abstract

The prospect of a world in which all text, audio, picture, and video documents are in digital form on easily modifiable media raises the issue of how to certify when a document was created or last changed. The problem is to time-stamp the data, not the medium. We propose computationally practical procedures for digital time-stamping of such documents so that it is infeasible for a user either to back-date or to forward-date his document, even with the collusion of a time-stamping service. Our procedures maintain complete privacy of the documents themselves, and require no record-keeping by the time-stamping service.

Key words

Time-stamp Hash 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. [1]
    J. Alter. When photographs lie. Newsweek, pp. 44–45, July 30, 1990.Google Scholar
  2. [2]
    M. Blum and S. Micali. How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits. SIAM J. Comput., 13(4): 850–864, Nov. 1984.Google Scholar
  3. [3]
    G. Brassard and M. Yung. One-way group actions. In Advances in Cryptology—Crypto '90. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, to appear.Google Scholar
  4. [4]
    I. Damgård. Collision-free hash functions and public-key signature schemes. In Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt '87, pp. 203–217. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 304, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1988.Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    I. Damgård. A design principle for hash functions. In Advances in Cryptology—Crypto '89 (ed. G. Brassard), pp. 416–427. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 435, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1990.Google Scholar
  6. [6]
    A. DeSantis and M. Yung. On the design of provably secure cryptographic hash functions. In Advances in Cryptology—Eurocrypt '90. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, to appear.Google Scholar
  7. [7]
    W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 22: 644–654, Nov. 1976.Google Scholar
  8. [8]
    Z. Galil, S. Haber, and M. Yung. Interactive public-key cryptosystems. Submitted for publication, 1990.Google Scholar
  9. [9]
    S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Probabilistic encryption. J. Comput. System Sci., 28: 270–299, April 1984.Google Scholar
  10. [10]
    S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and R. Rivest. A secure digital signature scheme. SIAM J. Comput., 17(2): 281–308, 1988.Google Scholar
  11. [11]
    A. Grundberg. Ask it no questions: The camera can lie. The New York Times, Section 2, pp. 1, 29, August 12,1990.Google Scholar
  12. [12]
    R. Impagliazzo, L. Levin, and M. Luby. Pseudorandom generation from one-way functions. In Proc. 21st STOC, pp. 12–24. ACM, New York, 1989.Google Scholar
  13. [13]
    R. Impagliazzo and M. Luby. One-way functions are essential for complexity-based cryptography. In Proc. 30th FOCS, pp. 230–235. IEEE, New York, 1989.Google Scholar
  14. [14]
    H. M. Kanare. Writing the Laboratory Notebook, p. 117. American Chemical Society, Washington, D.C., 1985.Google Scholar
  15. [15]
    R. C. Merkle. Secrecy, authentication, and public-key systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1979.Google Scholar
  16. [16]
    R. C. Merkle. One-way hash functions and DES. In Advances in Cryptology-3-Crypto '89 (ed. G. Brassard), pp. 428–446. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 435, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1990.Google Scholar
  17. [17]
    M. Naor and M. Yung. Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic applications. In Proc. 21st STOC, pp. 33–43. ACM, New York, 1989.Google Scholar
  18. [18]
    M. O. Rabin. Digitalized signatures. In Foundations of Secure Computation (ed.) R. A. DeMillo et al., pp. 155–168. Academic Press, New York, 1978.Google Scholar
  19. [19]
    R. Rivest. The MD4 message digest algorithm. In Advances in Cryptology—Crypto '90. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, to appear.Google Scholar
  20. [20]
    J. Rompel. One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure signatures. In Proc. 22nd STOC, pp. 387–394. ACM, New York, 1990.Google Scholar
  21. [21]
    C. Shannon. Prediction and entropy of printed English. Bell System Tech. J., 30: 50–64, 1951.Google Scholar
  22. [22]
    A. C. Yao. Theory and applications of trapdoor functions. In Proc. 23rd FOCS, pp. 80–91. IEEE, New York, 1982.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stuart Haber
    • 1
  • W. Scott Stornetta
    • 1
  1. 1.BellcoreMorristownUSA

Personalised recommendations