Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 9, Issue 3, pp 263–264

On two-person Nash implementable choice functions

  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Sanjay Srivastava


An elementary proof of a theorem on two-person Nash implementable choice functions is provided.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matthew O. Jackson
    • 1
  • Sanjay Srivastava
    • 2
  1. 1.MEDSNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA
  2. 2.GSIACarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA

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