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Erkenntnis

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 153–179 | Cite as

Ravens and relevance

  • Yael Cohen
Article

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References

  1. Carnap, R.: 1950, Logical Foundation of Probability, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2nd ed., 1962.Google Scholar
  2. Cartwright, N.: 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Clarendon Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
  3. Gaifman, H.: 1979, ‘Subjective Probability, Natural Predicates and Hempel's Ravens’, Erkenntnis 14.Google Scholar
  4. Linderbaum-Hasiasson, J.: 1940, ‘On Confirmation’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 5.Google Scholar
  5. Mackie, J. L.: 1963, ‘The Paradox of Confirmation’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13.Google Scholar
  6. Strawson, P. F.: 1952, Introduction to Logical Theory, Methuen.Google Scholar
  7. Wason, S.: 1966, ‘Reasoning’, New Horizons in Psychology, 1, (B. Foss (ed.), Penguin). See discussion in Cohen J. L., 1981, ‘Can Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4, 317–331.Google Scholar
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  9. Watkins, J. W. N.: 1960, ‘Conformation Without Background Knowledge’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10.Google Scholar
  10. Vendler, Z.: 1962, ‘Each and Every, Any and All’, Mind 71.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yael Cohen
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Humanities Department of PhilosophyThe Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael

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