Journal of Cryptology

, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp 87–99 | Cite as

Necessary and sufficient conditions for collision-free hashing

  • Alexander Russell
Article

Abstract

This paper determines an exact relationship between collision-free hash functions and other cryptographic primitives. Namely, it introduces a new concept, the pseudopermutation, and shows that the existence of collision-free hash functions is equivalent to the existence of claw-free pairs of pseudopermutations. We also give a simple construction of collision-free hash functions from everywhere-defined claw-free (pseudo-) permutations.

Key words

Cryptography Hash functions 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Russell
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratory for Computer ScienceMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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