Journal of Mathematical Biology

, Volume 33, Issue 7, pp 703–722 | Cite as

Automata, repeated games and noise

  • Martin A. Nowak
  • Karl Sigmund
  • Esam El-Sedy


We consider two-state automata playing repeatedly the Prisoner's Dilemma (or any other 2 × 2-game). The 16 × 16-payoff matrix is computed for the limiting case of a vanishingly small noise term affecting the interaction. Some results concerning the evolution of populations of automata under the action of selection are obtained. The special role of “win-stay, lose-shift”-strategies is examined.


Stochastic Process Probability Theory Special Role Mathematical Biology Matrix Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin A. Nowak
    • 1
  • Karl Sigmund
    • 2
  • Esam El-Sedy
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of ZoologyUniversity of OxfordOxfordU.K.
  2. 2.Institut für MathematikUniversität Wien Strudlhofgasse 4ViennaAustria
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsAin Shames UniversityAbassia, CairoEgypt

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