Public Choice

, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 175–181 | Cite as

Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking

  • Elie Appelbaum
  • Eliakim Katz
Article

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References

  1. Bhagwati, J.N., and Srinivasan, T.N. (1980). Revenue seeking: A generalization of the theory of tariffs, Journal of Political Economy 88: 1069–1087.Google Scholar
  2. Hillman, A.L., and Katz, E. (1984). Risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power. Economic Journal 94: 104–110.Google Scholar
  3. Krueger, A.O. (1974). The political economy of the rent seeking society. American Economic Review 64: 291–303.Google Scholar
  4. Posner, R.A. (1975). The social cost of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy 83: 807–827.Google Scholar
  5. Tollison, R.D. (1982). Rent seeking: A survey. Kyklos 35, Fasc. 4: 575–602.Google Scholar
  6. Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare cost of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5 (June): 224–232.Google Scholar
  7. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Towards a theory of rent-seeking society. College Station, Tx.: Texas A & M University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Tullock, G. (1984), Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking: A comment. Public Choice 43: 95–97.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elie Appelbaum
    • 1
  • Eliakim Katz
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsYork UniversityDownsviewCanada
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBar Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsYork UniversityDownsviewCanada

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