Public Choice

, Volume 48, Issue 2, pp 175–181 | Cite as

Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking

  • Elie Appelbaum
  • Eliakim Katz


Public Finance Social Cost Rent Seek Full Social Cost 
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  8. Tullock, G. (1984), Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking: A comment. Public Choice 43: 95–97.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elie Appelbaum
    • 1
  • Eliakim Katz
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsYork UniversityDownsviewCanada
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBar Ilan UniversityRamat GanIsrael
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsYork UniversityDownsviewCanada

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