Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 131–136

An alternative characterization of the uniform rule

  • Stephen Ching
Article

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating some amount of a commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness. This characterization strengthens two interesting results due to Sprumont (1991). Our method of proof involves only elementary arguments.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephen Ching
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA

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