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Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp 111–130 | Cite as

Chaos in game dynamics

  • Brian Skyrms
Article

Abstract

Two examples demonstrate the possibility of extremely complicated non-convergent behavior in evolutionary game dynamics. For the Taylor-Jonker flow, the stable orbits for three strategies were investigated by Zeeman. Chaos does not occur with three strategies. This papers presents numerical evidence that chaotic dynamics on a “strange attractor” does occur with four strategies. Thus phenomenon is closely related to known examples of complicated behavior in Lotka-Volterra ecological models.

Key words

evolutionary games game dynamics chaos 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Brian Skyrms
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of California, IrvineIrvineU.S.A.

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