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Erkenntnis

, Volume 44, Issue 3, pp 279–304 | Cite as

Zitierte zeichenreihen

Eine Theorie des harmlos nichtextensionalen Gebrauchs von Anführungszeichen
  • Olaf Müller
Article

Abstract

We use quotation marks when we wish to refer to an expression. We can and do so refer even when this expression is composed of characters which do not occur in our alphabet. That's why Tarski's, Quine's, and Geach's theories of quotation don't work. The proposals of Davidson, Frege, and C. Washington, however, do not provide a plausible account of quotation either. The problem is to construct a Tarskian theory of truth for an object language which contains quotation marks, without appealing to quotation marks in the metalanguage. I propose to supply Tarski's truth definition with an axiom which determines the denotation of all expressions containing quotation marks. According to this axiom, quotation marks create a non-extensional context. Since our admitting such contexts does not lead to any difficulties in our recursive truth characterization, we may indeed dispense with extensionalism. Finally, I argue that we classify and denote expressions in the very same way that we classify and denote extralinguistic entities.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olaf Müller
    • 1
  1. 1.GöttingenGermany

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