Theory and Decision

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 275–288 | Cite as

Group decision and negotiation support in evolving, nonshared information contexts

  • Melvin F. Shakun
Article

Abstract

Based on evolutionary systems design (ESD), group decision and negotiation support in evolving, nonshared information contexts is discussed. A non-shared information context — one without full information sharing — is associated with what has been loosely called a ‘noncooperative’ context in the group decision and negotiation support systems (GDNSS) literature. Without full information sharing, we have a game with incomplete information that, in general, is evolving. The paper discusses how the GDNSS, MEDIATOR, supports evolution of the group problem representation — a process of consensus seeking (through information sharing, here partial) subject to problem adaptation and restructuring within which compromise is possible.

Keywords

Group decision negotiation evolving contexts nonshared information evolutionary systems design 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Melvin F. Shakun
    • 1
  1. 1.New York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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