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Public Choice

, Volume 39, Issue 2, pp 245–268 | Cite as

Centralized vote-trading

  • Kenneth J. Koford
Article

Abstract

This paper presents a model of centralized vote-trading in a legislature. In this model, legislators trade only with party leaders, who set prices at which they will buy needed vote-changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills. Each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders, and purchases promises from the leaders to pass (or defeat) particular bills of high concern to the legislator, relative to the price the leguslator must pay.

This model is intended as a formal representation of an ‘efficient’ and possibly desirable legislature; modifications are needed to make it useful in describing actual legislatures. However, some evidence is cited to show that this model better accords with reality than previous vote-trading models.

Keywords

Public Finance Formal Representation Party Leader High Concern Good Accord 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kenneth J. Koford
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of DelawareNewark

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