Theory and Decision

, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 149–175 | Cite as

Games, goals, and bounded rationality

  • Leigh Tesfatsion
Article

Abstract

A generalization of the standard n-person game is presented, with flexible information requirements suitable for players constrained by certain types of bounded rationality. Strategies (complete contingency plans) are replaced by “policies”, i.e., endmean pairs of goals and controls (partial contingency plans), which results in naturally disconnected player choice sets. Well-known existence theorems for pure strategy Nash equilibrium and bargaining solutions are generalized to policy games by modifying connectedness (convexity) requirements.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Existence Theorem Pure Strategy Information Requirement Bargaining Solution 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leigh Tesfatsion
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. of EconomicsUniversity of Southern CaliforniaUniversity ParkUSA
  2. 2.Los AngelesUSA

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