European Journal of Law and Economics

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 83–95 | Cite as

Multiproduct activity and competition policy: The Tetra Pak case

  • Aurora García Gallego
  • Nikolaos Georgantzis

Abstract

We suggest the Tetra Pak case as a real-world example to study the implications of multiproduct activity for European Competition Policy. Tetra Pak, a monopolist in aseptic carton packaging of liquid food, competes with Elopak in the nonaseptic sector. The EC Commission used the effect of Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector on its rival's performance as an evidence of the former's anticompetitive behavior. With linear demand and cost functions and interdependent demands, the Commission's position can be supported. However, a more general model suggests that the Commission's conclusions cannot be supported as the unique outcome of the analysis of the information available.

Key words

strategic production demand complementarity substitutability 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aurora García Gallego
    • 1
  • Nikolaos Georgantzis
    • 2
  1. 1.Departamento de EconomicaUniversitat Jaume ICastellónSpain
  2. 2.Departamento de EconomicaUniversitat Jaume ICastellónSpain

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