Public Choice

, Volume 73, Issue 3, pp 261–282 | Cite as

The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions

  • Robert E. Dorsey


Experimental results are presented showing the effects of allowing real time revisions of voluntary contributions for the provision of a public good. Four public good payoff functions are examined, each of which generates specific equilibria. Evidence of increased provision of the public good is demonstrated for: (i) the case in which revisions are limited to increases and a provision point exists, and also (ii) when there is a high initial marginal return from the public good.


Public Good Public Finance Payoff Function Voluntary Contribution Marginal Return 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert E. Dorsey
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MississippiOxford

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