, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 101–113 | Cite as

Husserl and the representational theory of mind

  • Ronald McIntyre
Topos: Current Issues in Phenomenology


Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality — the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.


Mental State Mental Representation Phenomenal Quality Mental Causation Transcendental Phenomenology 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronald McIntyre
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, NorthridgeNorthridgeUSA

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