Public Choice

, Volume 37, Issue 2, pp 189–204

Why so much stability

  • Gordon Tullock
Article

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References

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gordon Tullock
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Study of Public ChoiceUSA

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