Public Choice

, Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 267–277 | Cite as

Initiatives and government expenditures

  • Jeffrey S. Zax


This paper demonstrates that provisions for initiatives have important effects on government spending. Provisions for initiatives encourage legislatures to approve any proposal which might attract substantial popular support. If these proposals are more likely to advocate increases than reductions in expenditures, the presence of initiative provisions will increase total expenditures. Direct government expenditures per capita are significantly higher in both states and municipalities which permit initiatives.


Public Finance Total Expenditure Government Expenditure Government Spending Popular Support 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeffrey S. Zax
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, Queens College and the Graduate CenterC.U.N.Y.USA
  2. 2.National Bureau of Economic ResearchNew York

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