Rawlsian Nash solutions
We investigate the conditions which guarantee the choice of Rawlsian solutions by players of unequal maximin positions bargaining under Nash rules. The conditions, viz., subsymmetry and the location of the Pareto set, relate to the structure of the utility set,S.
KeywordsNash Rawls subsymmetry equity
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