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Theory and Decision

, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 11–28 | Cite as

On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games

  • H. Andrew Michener
  • Kathryn Potter
  • Melvin M. Sakurai
Article

Abstract

This paper reports the first cross-study competitive test of thecore solution in side-payment games where the core is nonempty and nonunique (i.e., larger than a single point). The core was tested against five alternative theories including the Shapley value, the disruption nucleolus, the nucleolus, the 2-center, and the equality solution. A generalized Euclidean distance metric which indexes the average distance between an observed payoff vector and the entire set of predicted payoff vectors (Bonacich, 1979) was used as the measure of goodness-of-fit. Analysis of data assembled from six previously reported studies (encompassing a total of 1,464 observations over 56 3-person and 4-person side-payment games) showed the core to predict less accurately than the Shapley value, disruption nucleolus, and nucleolus solutions (p < 0.01). These findings are consistent with previous empirical results that show the core to have a low level of predictive accuracy in side-payment games.

Keywords

Euclidean Distance Single Point Empirical Result Average Distance Predictive Accuracy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Co 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. Andrew Michener
    • 1
  • Kathryn Potter
    • 1
  • Melvin M. Sakurai
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of SociologyUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonWisconsinUSA
  2. 2.Research Information ServicesHonoluluUSA

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