Public Choice

, Volume 56, Issue 3, pp 259–269 | Cite as

Fiscal decentralization and government size

  • Michael L. Marlow


Numerous studies have attempted to model the possible factors contributing to universal growth in public sectors. This paper analyzes one device that appears capable of controlling some of that growth: fiscal decentralization. The results reported here also support the use of monopoly government assumptions in models of public policy


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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael L. Marlow
    • 1
  1. 1.U.S. Department of TreasuryWashington

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