Biology and Philosophy

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 217–228 | Cite as

Selection and Science: Critical notice of David Hull's Science as a Process

  • Alex Rosenberg


An examination of Hull's claims about the nature of interactors, replicators and selection, with special attention to how the genetic material realizes the first two types, and a critique of Hull's attempt to apply the theory of natural selection to the explanation of scientific change, and in particular the succession of theories. I conclude that difficulties attending the molecular instantiation of Hull's theory are vastly increased when it comes to be applied to “memes.”


Natural Selection Genetic Material Scientific Change Critical Notice 
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  1. Dawkins, R.: 1976, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, New York.Google Scholar
  2. Dawkins, R.: 1982, The Extended Phenotype, Freeman, San Francisco.Google Scholar
  3. Horan, B.: 1988, ‘Theoretical Models, Biological Complexity, and the Semantic View of Theories’, in A. Fine and J. Leplin (eds.), PSA 1988, Volume II, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Mich., pp. 265–277.Google Scholar
  4. Hull, D.: 1988, Science as a Process, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alex Rosenberg
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaRiversideU.S.A.

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