Public Choice

, Volume 50, Issue 1–3, pp 5–25

Incumbent performance and electoral control

  • John Ferejohn


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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Ferejohn

There are no affiliations available

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