Public Choice

, Volume 44, Issue 1, pp 7–41 | Cite as

The pure theory of large two-candidate elections

  • John O. Ledyard
Article

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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • John O. Ledyard

There are no affiliations available

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