Public Choice

, Volume 69, Issue 1, pp 69–79 | Cite as

Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets

  • Jason F. Shogren
  • Kyung H. Baik
Article

Abstract

Given Millner and Pratt's (1989) finding of behavior inconsistent with theory, we reexamine efficient rent-seeking in experimental markets. We show that (a) when r = 3, no Nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency, and (b) when r = 1, with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix, rent-seeking behavior is consistent with both Nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses.

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References

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jason F. Shogren
    • 1
  • Kyung H. Baik
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsIowa State UniversityAmes
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsAppalachian State UniversityBoone

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