Skip to main content
Log in

The construction of the demand for public goods and the theory of income redistribution

  • Notes
  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Concluding comments

Traditional analysis of public goods like income redistribution explicitly assumes that people's preferences toward a specific good differ. Given this assumption, we see no reason why some people's demands cannot extend downward into the negative quadrant or originate in the negative quadrant. In short, we see reason why a government good or service cannot be a ‘public good’ to some people and, at the same time, a ‘public good’ to other people. The purpose of this note has been to draw out the logical implications of the assumption that people's individual demands are spread out over the first and fourth quadrants. We have shown that such as assumption requires an adjustment in the way the demand for a public good is constructed and that such an assumption requires that we adjust significantly our conclusions regarding the Pareto efficiency of collectivization of aid to the poor.

A central conclusion drawn from the analysis is that a move from private to public charity may very well lead to a reduction in the amount of aid received by the poor and may, therefore, be Pareto inefficient. Further, we have concluded that people other than the poor may, because of the public poverty programme, be necessary beneficiaries of the public transfer system. There may be good arguments for public charity; however, the public goods argument is not necessarily one of them.

These conclusions should not seem bizarre. When the political process permits income redistribution, it should surprise no one that people with negative as well as positive demands for poverty relief allow their preferences to be known to the people who must act on the legislation. In addition, it should surprise no one to learn that political compromises, involving public subsidy programs for the poor and the not-so-poor, are, from time to time, developed and that the welfare state, for that reason and to that extent, can expand substantially beyond the bounds implied in efforts to help only the truly poor.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Friedman, M. Capitalism and freedom. (1962). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibenstein, H. (1950). Bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand. Quarterly Journal of Economics, May: 183–207.

  • McKenzie, R.B. (forthcoming). Taxation and income redistribution: An unsympathetic critique of practice and theory. In R. Formaini (Ed.), Taxation and society. San Francisco: Cato Institute.

  • Musgrave, R.B., and Musgrave, P.B. (1973). Public finance in theory and practice. New York: McGraw-Hill. Chapter 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. (1967). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chapter 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1979). Objectives of income redistribution. Blacksburg, V.: Center for the Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1977). Revealing the demand for transfers. In R.S. Auster (Ed.), American Revolution, Papers and Proceedings.

  • Yandle, B. (1974). Mixed Goods and Bads. Public Choice. Fall: 95–105.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

The author is indebted to Diana Bailey, High Macauley, Michael Maloney, and Bruce Yandle for their discussions and comments instrumental in the development of the arguments presented here.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

McKenzie, R.B. The construction of the demand for public goods and the theory of income redistribution. Public Choice 36, 337–344 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123790

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123790

Keywords

Navigation