Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 267–279

A directly democratic and Federal Europe

  • Bruno S. Frey
Articles

DOI: 10.1007/BF00119267

Cite this article as:
Frey, B.S. Constit Polit Econ (1996) 7: 267. doi:10.1007/BF00119267

Abstract

This paper endeavors to take up the neglected aspects of federalism and direct democracy. It emphasizes the mutual dependence of the two for reaching the goals of efficiency and trust. Direct democracy is seen to preserve federalism, but even more importantly, federalism is taken to enable and to preserve effective direct democracy. Empirical evidence is adduced showing in particular that direct democracy leads to higher efficiency in the sense of lowering transaction costs. A proposal for a novel combination of federalism and direct democracy—which is called FOCJ (the acronym for “Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions”)—is suggested for Europe.

JEL classification

D7 H1 H7 PO 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruno S. Frey
    • 1
  1. 1.University of ZurichInstitute for Empirical Economic ResearchZurichSwitzerland

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