Public Choice

, Volume 56, Issue 2, pp 101–119 | Cite as

Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science

  • William C. Mitchell


Public Finance Public Choice Political Science 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • William C. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of OregonEugene

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