Public Choice

, Volume 89, Issue 1–2, pp 1–16

Public sector unions and public spending

  • Michael L. Marlow
  • William Orzechowski
Article

Abstract

This study examines the influence of public sector unions on the expansion of the public sector. Based on public goods theory, our paper models how unions influence the supply of and demand for public sector activities. On the demand side, public sector unions are special interests which advocate public sector expansion to policy makers; on the supply side, they exert pressure to maintain and expand monopoly powers. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between public sector unionism and public spending.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael L. Marlow
    • 1
  • William Orzechowski
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsCalifornia Polytechnic State UniversitySan Luis Obispo
  2. 2.Alexis de Tocqueville InstitutionArlington

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