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Journal of Financial Services Research

, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 143–164 | Cite as

Subsidization of S&Ls under the flat-rate deposit insurance system: Some empirical estimates

  • Amy Burnett
  • Ramesh K. S. Rao
  • Seha M. Tiniç
Article

Abstract

This study provides some estimates of the magnitude of the subsidies extracted by S&L holding companies under the present flat-rate deposit insurance system. The results suggest that the flat-rate deposit insurance system induces substantially uneven and inequitable distribution of subsidies among thrift institutions. The analysis of the thrift institutions' asset volatilities over the 1966–1988 period does not support the claim that deregulation of the industry has led to a systematic increase in risk-taking in the industry. On the other hand, we find that a large fraction of the asset volatilities are attributable to firm-specific investment policies and that the risk of the institutions' assets change considerably over time. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that switching to a risk-based deposit insurance system would be economically more efficient than the present scheme. We provide some recommendations for policy changes that can increase the efficacy of risk-based insurance by increasing the level of monitoring by depositors and the financial markets.

Keywords

Large Fraction Financial Market Policy Change Insurance System Empirical Estimate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amy Burnett
    • 1
  • Ramesh K. S. Rao
    • 2
  • Seha M. Tiniç
    • 2
  1. 1.University of RichmondRichmond
  2. 2.Graduate School of Business AdministrationUniversity of Texas at AustinAustin

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