Property rights and the marginal wildebeest: an economic analysis of wildlife conservation options in Kenya

This paper discusses policy responses to the potential loss of biodiversity in the Mara Area of Kenya from the conversion of essentially wild and undeveloped rangeland to developed agriculture. Property rights are central to the debate, and raise two fundamental issues. First, to what extent do the Maasai, the traditional users and owners of the land, have the right to benefit from the development potential of their land to further their economic, social and political standing, even if by so doing they create domestic and global externalities through the loss of biodiversity. Second, if the state alienates their development rights in the name of conservation, then to what extent should the state compensate the Maasai for their lost economic opportunities. To the Maasai, conservation as implemented through Government policy is a publicc bad: they are denied access to resources, their costs of production are significantly increased, and development is slowed down or actively discouraged. A cost:benefit analysis suggests that it is neither supportable nor sustainable to condemn the Maasai to a poverty trap on behalf of conservation, and that it is instead socially prolitable for the Kenyan Government to meet in full their opportunity costs of forgone economic benefits.