Acta Applicandae Mathematica

, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp 247–265 | Cite as

The evolution of stochastic strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma

  • Martin Nowak
  • Karl Sigmund
Article

Abstract

The evolution of reactive strategies for repeated 2×2-games occurring in biology is investigated by means of an adaptive dynamics.

AMS subject classifications (1980)

34C35 90D15 80D45 92A12 

Key words

Prisoner's Dilemma reactive strategies iterated games adaptive dynamics 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Nowak
    • 1
  • Karl Sigmund
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of ZoologyUniversity of OxfordOxfordEngland
  2. 2.Institut für Mathematik der Universität WienViennaAustria
  3. 3.IIASALaxenburgAustria

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