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Does information increase political support for pension reform?

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Abstract

An opinion poll on a representative sample of Italians suggests that it does. We focus on reforms increasing retirement age or cutting pension benefits. We find that individuals who are more informed about the costs and functioning of the pension system are more willing to accept reforms. We do not find that exposure to media coverage of pension issues significantly improves information. We perform a controlled experiment asking a random subsample of individuals to read a descriptive note on the Italian pension system before answering the questionnaire, finding that citizens reading the note are more willing to support pension reforms.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bocconi University and IGIER, Milan, Italy

    Tito Boeri & Guido Tabellini

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  1. Tito Boeri
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  2. Guido Tabellini
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Correspondence to Tito Boeri.

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Boeri, T., Tabellini, G. Does information increase political support for pension reform?. Public Choice 150, 327–362 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9706-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9706-6

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