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Ahn, T.K., Wilson, R.K. Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to the experimental study of social dilemmas. Public Choice 143, 327–333 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9623-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9623-8