Evolution in knockout conflicts: The fixed strategy case
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A group of individuals resolve their disputes by a knockout tournament. In each round of the tournament, the remaining contestants form pairs which compete, the winners progressing to the next round and the losers being eliminated. The payoff received depends upon how far the player has progressed and a cost is incurred only when it is defeated. We only consider strategies in which individuals are constrained to adopt a fixed play throughout the successive rounds. The case where individuals can vary their choice of behaviour from round to round will be treated elsewhere. The complexity of the system is investigated and illustrated both by special cases and numerical examples.
KeywordsPayoff Broom Dominance Hierarchy Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Successive Round
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