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Analysis of anticorruption strategies in a modified Power–Society model

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Abstract

The paper presents a modified model of the interaction between corrupt power hierarchies and civil society. The suggested improvements and generalizations consist of more comprehensively defining the damage from corruption and the value of suppressing corruption that are more coherent with the considered phenomenon, and the different types of bureaucratic reactions to anticorruption policies, as well as setting the boundary conditions for the model’s equations, are considered. The modified model serves as a base for computing the relative efficiency of different anticorruption strategies for hierarchies of different topologies and behaviors, taking into account the intensity of the influence of civil society on government bodies and agencies. It is found that, based on the assumptions of this model, suppressing corruption among the low-ranked bureaucrats in weakly branched hierarchies and among high-ranked bureaucrats among strongly branched hierarchies are the most efficient strategies. At the same time, strongly centralized hierarchies are the most sensitive to the choice of anticorruption strategies. In addition, it is shown that the suppression of senior bureaucrats is more efficient for more irresponsible hierarchies, whereas the suppression of low-ranked bureaucrats is most efficient for hierarchies with a relatively strong influence of civil society on power distribution. A brief comparison of the traditional approach to the mathematical investigation of corruption, using the game-theoretic model, with the systemic-social approach presented in the current and earlier papers, is also given.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Keldysh Institute of Applied Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 125047, Russia

    A. P. Mikhailov & E. A. Gorbatikov

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  1. A. P. Mikhailov
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  2. E. A. Gorbatikov
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Correspondence to A. P. Mikhailov.

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Original Russian Text © A.P. Mikhailov, E.A. Gorbatikov, 2016, published in Matematicheskoe Modelirovanie, 2016, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 47–68.

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Mikhailov, A.P., Gorbatikov, E.A. Analysis of anticorruption strategies in a modified Power–Society model. Math Models Comput Simul 8, 709–724 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1134/S2070048216060132

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S2070048216060132

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