Abstract
A model of several interacting Cournot markets is considered. The markets are named interacting because the same number of producers act on each of them. Every producer chooses his own supply volumes on every market using the price situations, his own costs, and production and delivery limitations. It is proved that in the case of linear demand functions the problem of finding the Nash equilibria in the model of interacting Cournot markets represents a potential game, i.e., it is equivalent to a mathematical programming problem. Nonlinear demand functions linearization procedures and preferences of initial problem reduction to the potential game are discussed.
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Original Russian Text © V.I. Zorkaltsev, M.A. Kiseleva, 2015, published in Sibirskii Zhurnal Vychislitel’noi Matematiki, 2015, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 361–368.
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Zorkaltsev, V.I., Kiseleva, M.A. Oligopolistic interacting markets. Numer. Analys. Appl. 8, 293–298 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1995423915040023
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1995423915040023