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Too little, too late? US sanctions against Nord Stream 2 and the transatlantic relationship

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Journal of Transatlantic Studies Aims and scope

Abstract

In recent years, the transatlantic relationship has been under increasing strain. A key point of friction has been Nord Stream 2, a contentious gas pipeline project connecting Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea. This study seeks to expand the primarily euro-centric scholarly work on Nord Stream 2 by tracing and explaining the objectives, timing, and effectiveness of US sanctions against Nord Stream 2. Drawing on the canonical ‘multiple streams’ model of the policy process, I find that US lawmakers were primarily driven by Russian interference in US elections, and concerns about Europe’s high dependency on Russian energy supplies and the weakened geopolitical position of Ukraine. The annual budgeting legislation provided the window of opportunity to pass the sanctions. The sanctions were initially very effective and resulted in the termination of contracts for companies working with the Nord Stream 2 consortium, but Russian countermeasures have kept the project afloat. This points to the limits of US structural power.

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Notes

  1. The sanctions also apply to TurkStream, a two-string pipeline from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea. However, both strings were already completed when the US imposed sanctions; therefore, their effect on this pipeline project is not included.

  2. Jeff Mason, ‘Trump lashes Germany over gas pipeline deal, calls it Russia’s ‘captive’,’ Reuters, July 11, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-pipeline/trump-lashes-germany-over-gas-pipeline-deal-calls-it-russias-captive-idUSKBN1K10VI.

    Reuters, ‘Biden: Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a ‘bad deal’ for Europe,’ Reuters, August 25, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-energy-europe-usa/biden-nord-stream-2-pipeline-is-a-bad-deal-for-europe-idUSKCN1101AP.

  3. Roberto Cantoni. What’s in a Pipe?: NATO’s Confrontation on the 1962 Large-Diameter Pipe Embargo. Technology and culture 58, 1 (2017a): 67–96.

  4. Stine Jacobsen and Vladimir Soldatkin. Nord Stream 2 clears major hurdle as Denmark OKs gas pipeline. Reuters, October 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gazprom-nordstream-2/nord-stream-2-clears-major-hurdle-as-denmark-oks-gas-pipeline-idUSKBN1X91KR.

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  7. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, 165.

  8. Itay Fischhendler, Lior Herman, and Nir Maoz, ‘The political economy of energy sanctions: insights from a global outlook 1938–2017,’ Energy research & social science 34 (2017): 62–71.

  9. Andreas Goldthau, ‘Assessing Nord Stream 2: regulation, geopolitics & energy security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe & the UK,’ European Center for Energy and Resource Security: Strategy Paper, no. 10 (2016).

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  10. Balázs R. Sziklai, László A. Kóczy, and Dávid Csercsik, ‘The impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European gas market bargaining positions,’ Energy Policy 144 (2020): 111,692.

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  11. Bjorn Gens, ‘Germany’s Russia policy and geo-economics: Nord Stream 2, sanctions and the question of EU leadership towards Russia,’ Global Affairs 5, 4–5 (2019): 315–334.

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  12. Antto Vihma and Mikael Wigell, ‘Unclear and present danger: Russia’s geoeconomics and the Nord Stream II pipeline,’ Global Affairs 2, 4 (2016): 377–388.

  13. See for example:

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    Maarten Smeets, Can economic sanctions be effective? WTO Staff Working Paper No. ERSD-2018–03 (2018).

  14. Fischhendler, Herman, and Maoz, ‘The political economy of energy sanctions’, 62.

  15. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, ‘The entanglement of energy, grand strategy, and international security,’ in The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, ed. Andreas Goldthau (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 30–47.

  16. David M. Rowe, ‘Economic sanctions do work: Economic statecraft and the oil embargo of Rhodesia,’ Security Studies 9, 1–2 (1999): 254–287.

  17. Akbar E. Torbat, ‘Impacts of the US trade and financial sanctions on Iran,’ World Economy 28, 3 (2005): 407–434.

  18. Thijs Van de Graaf, ‘The ‘oil weapon’ reversed? Sanctions against Iran and US-EU structural power,’ Middle East Policy 20, 3 (2013): 145–163.

  19. This pipeline was initially called the Yamal pipeline and should not be confused with the Yamal-Europe pipeline that was constructed in the 1990s. The pipeline ran through Ukraine.

  20. Susan Colbourn, ‘An Interpreter or two: defusing NATO’s Siberian pipeline dispute, 1981–1982,’ Journal of Transatlantic Studies18 (2020): 131–151.

    Per Högselius, Red gas: Russia and the origins of European energy dependence, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 189–190.

    Antony Blinken, Ally Versus Ally: America, Europe, and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis, (New York: Praeger, 1987).

  21. Roberto Cantoni, ‘Debates at NATO and the EEC in Response to the Soviet “Oil Offensive” in the Early 1960s,’in Cold War Energy ed. Jeronim Perovic (Cham: Springer Nature, 2017b), 131–161.

  22. Van de Graaf, ‘The ‘oil weapon’ reversed?’.

  23. Susan Strange, States and markets (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988), 24–25.

  24. Nigel Gould-Davies, ‘Russia, the West and Sanctions,’ Survival, 62, 1 (2020): 23.

  25. Alan Cafruny, and Ksenia Kirkham, ‘EU ‘Sovereignty’ in Global Governance: The Case of Sanctions’ in Global Governance in Transformation, ed. Leonid Grigoryev, and Adrian Pabst (Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2020), 89–104.

  26. Högselius, ‘Red gas’, Rowe, ‘Economic sanctions do work’, Van de Graaf, ’The ‘oil weapon’ reversed?’.

  27. Cafruny and Kirkham, ‘EU ‘Sovereignty’, Gould-Davies, ‘Russia, the West’, Strange, States and markets, Van de Graaf, ’The ‘oil weapon’ reversed?’.

  28. Kirsten Westphal, ‘Nord Stream 2 – Germany’s Dilemma,’ SWP Comment, April 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2021C32_NordStream2.pdf.

  29. Patricia Zengerle, ‘U.S. senators want stiff sanctions to deter Russia election meddling,’ Reuters, April 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions-exclusive-idUSKCN1RF13V.

  30. Florian Böller, and Lukas D. Herr, ‘From Washington without love: congressional foreign policy making and US-Russian relations under president Trump,’ Contemporary Politics 26, 1 (2020): 17–37.

  31. Patricia Zengerle, ‘Trump administration holds off on new Russia sanctions, despite law,’ Reuters, January 30, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions/trump-administration-holds-off-on-new-russia-sanctions-despite-law-idUSKBN1FI2V7.

  32. Peter Baker, and Sophia Kishkovsky, Trump Signs Russian Sanctions Into Law, With Caveats, August 2, 2017, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/world/europe/trump-russia-sanctions.html.

  33. Department of State, ‘CAATSA/CRIEEA Sect. 232 Public Guidance,’ (2017), https://www.state.gov/caatsa-crieea-section-232-public-guidance/.

  34. The public guidance can be adjusted by the Administration and is not fixed.

  35. John Barrasso, ‘Senators Push to Stop Russia’s Nord Stream II Natural Gas Pipeline,’ (2018), https://www.barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/3/senators-push-to-stop-russia-s-nord-stream-ii-natural-gas-pipeline.

  36. Lisbeth Aggestam, and Adrian Hyde‐Price, ‘Double Trouble: Trump, Transatlantic Relations and European Strategic Autonomy,’ JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 57, S1 (2019): 114–127.

    Asma Sana Bilal, and Nabiya Imran, ‘Emerging Contours of Transatlantic Relationship under Trump Administration,’ Policy perspectives 16, 1 (2019): 3–21.

  37. Reuters, ‘U.S. envoy warns sanctions still an option against Nord Stream 2,’ Reuters, November 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1NI1FY.

  38. John Bolton, The Room Where It Happened (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020): 110.

  39. Barbara Starr, and Jennifer Hansler, ‘As world leaders condemn Russian aggression, Trump says he and Putin ‘get along,’ CNN, September 5, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/05/politics/trump-putin-relationship/index.html.

  40. Ted Cruz, ‘Sens. Cruz, Shaheen Lead Bipartisan Bill to Impose Sanctions for Involvement in Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline,’ Press release Ted Cruz, (2019), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4474.

  41. Cantoni, ‘What’s in a Pipe?’.

  42. Patricia Zengerle, ‘U.S. senators offer bill targeting Russia-Germany pipeline,’ Reuters, May 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-gazprom-nordstream-usa/us-senators-offer-bill-targeting-russia-germany-pipeline-idUSKCN1SK24A.

  43. Moniek de Jong, and Thijs Van de Graaf, ‘Lost in Regulation: Nord Stream 2 and the Limits of the European Commission’s Geo-Economic Power,’ Journal of European Integration 43, 4 (2021): 495–510.

  44. Nord Stream 2 AG, ‘1000 Kilometres of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Laid,’ Nord Stream 2 AG, (2019), https://www.nord-stream2.com/media-info/news-events/1-000-kilometres-of-the-nord-stream-2-pipeline-laid-122/.

  45. Danish Energy Agency, ‘Permit for Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipelines,’ Danish Energy Agency, (2019), https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/OlieGas/permit_nord_stream_2.pdf.

  46. Robert S. Mueller, ‘Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election, Vol. I’, U.S. Department of Justice, (2019): 1.

  47. Demetri Sevastopulo, Henry Foy, and Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, ‘US lawmakers agree bill to force Trump on Nord Stream 2 sanctions,’ Financial Times, December 10, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/3a0fde0c-1b10-11ea-97df-cc63de1d73f4.

  48. A must-pass bill: ‘A vitally important measure that Congress must enact, such as annual money bills to fund operations of the government. Because of their must-pass quality, these measures often attract "riders" (unrelated policy provisos).’ Source: United States Senate, 2021, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/must_pass_bill.htm.

  49. Jordan Tama, ‘Forcing the President’s Hand: How the US Congress Shapes Foreign Policy through Sanctions Legislation. Foreign policy analysis 16, 3 (2020): 397–416.

  50. Senate, ‘"Must pass" bill," Senate, (2021) https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/must_pass_bill.htm

  51. Ted Cruz, ‘Sen. Cruz: If Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Is Completed, It Will Be the Fault of This Administration,’ Press release Ted Cruz, (2019), https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4793.

  52. Alexander Medvedev, "Gazprom reiterates no gas exports via Ukraine after 2019." Reuters, June 9, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-gazprom-supplies/update-1-gazprom-reiterates-no-gas-exports-via-ukraine-after-2019-idUSL5N0YV2EK20150609.

  53. Department of State, ‘Fact Sheet on U.S. Opposition to Nord Stream 2,’ (2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/fact-sheet-on-u-s-opposition-to-nord-stream-2/index.html.

  54. Ted Cruz, ‘Letter to Allseas,’ Webpage of Senator Cruz, December 18, 2019, https://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Letters/2019.12.18%20Letter%20to%20Allseas%20CEO.pdf.

  55. Benjamin L. Schmitt, ‘They’re Gonna Need A Bigger Boat: The Curious Voyage of the Akademik Cherskiy,’ Jamestown, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-theyre-gonna-need-a-bigger-boat-the-curious-voyage-of-the-akademik-cherskiy/.

  56. Department of State, ‘Updated Public Guidance for Sect. 232 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)’, 2020, https://www.state.gov/caatsa-crieea-section-232-public-guidance/.

  57. Department of State, ‘Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA),’ 2020, https://www.state.gov/protecting-europes-energy-security-act-peesa/.

  58. de Jong, Van de Graaf, and Haesebrouck, ‘A matter of preference’.

  59. Simone Pirani, and Jack Sharples, ‘The Russia-Ukraine gas transit deal: opening a new chapter,’ The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2020).

  60. Ibid.

  61. Kate Connolly, ‘‘Simply not OK’: removal of US troops worries German communities,’ The Guardian, August 2, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/02/removal-of-us-troops-from-germany-will-gravely-affect-local-communities.

  62. Reuters, ‘Construction of Nord Stream 2 pipeline resumes on Friday,’ Reuters, December 11, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-russia-nord-stream-construction/construction-of-nord-stream-2-pipeline-resumes-on-friday-idUKKBN28L1S8.

  63. Senator Cruz voted against the NDAA and also against the overturning of President Trump’s veto, as the NDAA hosts ‘Democrat priorities unrelated to national security’.

  64. Wintershall DEA, ‘2020 Annual Report’, 2021, https://wintershalldea.com/sites/default/files/media/files/Wintershall%20Dea%20annual%20report%202020.pdf, p. 129.

  65. America Hernandez, ‘German official calls for construction ‘moratorium’ on Nord Stream 2 to repair US relations,’ Politico, March 31, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/german-official-calls-for-construction-moratorium-on-nord-stream-2-to-repair-us-relations/.

  66. European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe,’ 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/hydrogen_strategy.pdf.

  67. Michael Nienaber, ‘Germany regrets U.S. decision to sanction Russian vessel involved in Nord Stream 2,’ Reuters, January 18, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN29N1PU.

  68. ibid.

  69. Andrew Desiderio, Martin Matishak and Natasha Bertrand, ‘Ted Cruz releases holds on Biden nominees as administration looks to get tough on Russia pipeline,’ Politico, March 18, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/18/ted-cruz-nord-stream-2-pipeline-476993.

  70. Natasha Bertrand and Andrew Desiderio,‘Biden looks to appoint special envoy to kill Russia-Germany energy pipeline’, Politico, April 7, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/07/biden-envoy-nord-stream-2-479706.

  71. John Lederman, ‘Ted Cruz holding up all State Department nominees over Russian pipeline’, NBC News, July 2, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/ted-cruz-holding-all-state-department-nominees-over-russian-pipeline-n1273009

  72. Timothy Gardner, ‘U.S. House panel passes amendment to stop sanctions waiver on Nord Stream 2’, Reuters, July 3, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-house-panel-passes-amendment-stop-sanctions-waiver-nord-stream-2-2021-07-02/

  73. Roberta Rampton, ‘Exclusive: In Warsaw, Trump to promote U.S. natural gas exports: Cohn,’ Reuters, June 28, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-lng-idUSKBN19J19F.

  74. Sigmar Gabriel, and Christian Kern, ‘Foreign Minister Gabriel and Austrian Federal Chancellor Kern on the imposition of Russia sanctions by the US Senate,’ Federal Foreign Office, June 15, 2017, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/170615-kern-russland/290666.

  75. WoodMackenzie, ‘Why Nord Stream 2 could cost US gas producers US$5 bln,’ 2020, https://www.woodmac.com/reports/gas-markets-why-nord-stream-2-could-cost-us-gas-producers-us5-bln-418263.

  76. These states are: Arkansas (12.8 bcm in 2019), California (3.4 bcm), Colorado (27.8 bcm), Louisiana (71.8 bcm), New Mexico (29.3 bcm), North Dakota (28.9 bcm), Ohio (73.6 bcm), Oklahoma (64.4 bcm), Pennsylvania (191.2 bcm), Texas (219 bcm), West Virginia (57 bcm), Wyoming (3.8 bcm).

    Data from the congressional proposals and EIA, ‘Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production,’ 2020, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_a_EPG0_FGS_mmcf_a.htm.

  77. OpenSecrets.org, ‘Oil & Gas: Top Recipient,’ 2018, https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.php?ind=E01&recipdetail=S&sortorder=U&mem=Y&cycle=2018

  78. Reuters, ‘Russia sees no certification risk for Nord Stream 2’ Reuters, June 3, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-sees-no-certification-risk-nord-stream-2-2021-06-03/

  79. Reuters, ‘Top shipping insurance group will not cover ships linked to Nord Stream 2,’ Reuters, 23 September, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-usa-energy-insurance/top-shipping-insurance-group-will-not-cover-ships-linked-to-nord-stream-2-idUSL5N2GK14X.

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de Jong, M. Too little, too late? US sanctions against Nord Stream 2 and the transatlantic relationship. J Transatl Stud 20, 213–229 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1057/s42738-022-00095-4

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