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Power in the chemical weapons prohibition regime and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

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Abstract

The presence of an international organisation—the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—in the chemical weapons (CW) prohibition regime and a large number of norms, rules and procedures contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) leads to the preponderance of institutional power in the CW prohibition regime. The paper analyses its manifestation, and contestation by other forms of power, in four key areas of the OPCW’s activities—disarmament, non-proliferation, internalisation of regime provisions, as well as assistance and protection. The subsequent discussion of the Syrian Arab Republic’s accession to the CWC identifies some great power politics, and hence compulsory power, at work. The concluding section raises the question of potentially changing power relationships as the CW prohibition regime transitions to a world in which declared CW stockpiles will have been destroyed and the OPCW increasingly focus on preventing the re-emergence of CW.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and should not be construed to represent official positions of the OPCW or any of its organs or Member States.

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Kelle, A. Power in the chemical weapons prohibition regime and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Int Polit 55, 403–420 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0083-3

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